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In her introduction to the 1984 edition of Tocqueville’s texts on prisons, Michelle 
Perrot calls Tocqueville the “anti-Bentham.”
1  I note this judgment at the beginning of an 
essay on utilitarianism and the French liberal tradition less to dispute an interpretation of 
Tocqueville than to call attention to the phrase itself. When Perrot exonerates Tocqueville 
from an association with Bentham, she can count on bringing alive in the minds of her 
readers an immediate sense of what Tocqueville was not: a one-sided thinker who 
reduced the complexities of social life to self-interest, a dogmatic utopian, a proto-
totalitarian with a mania for control and surveillance, in other words, a “utilitarian.”  
Unlike its place in Anglo-American intellectual life, where it functions as 
inspiration or worthy antagonist, utilitarianism in France is either largely invisible or used 
as a denigrating short-hand for what is wrong with modernity. As the philosopher Jean- 
Pierre Dupuy put it in 1995: “we know nothing about it because we don’t want to know 
anything.”
2 The purpose of this essay is to examine how this particular state of 
intellectual affairs came to be. Why, given common roots in the eighteenth century, did 
utilitarianism disappear as a serious system of thought in nineteenth-century France? 
After addressing this question, I turn to a few significant exceptions: moments of 
complex appreciation by French thinkers who deliberately engaged in a dialogue with 
utilitarianism. This part of the essay is less about the doctrine of utility than about its 
ability to provoke a particular kind of reflection in France. I suggest that these  
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exceptional voices—my examples are Tocqueville and Elie Halévy—use a discussion of 
the fate of utilitarianism in another social and political milieu as a kind of disruptive 
detour, a way to jolt their readers into a new perspective on the possibilities of political 
life. In doing so, they illustrate a distinctive impulse in French liberalism. 
Let me turn, then, to the question of why the discourse of utility is largely absent 
from French intellectual life. Lest you think this claim an exaggeration, consider the 
following examples. First, no French history of modern liberalism gives a prominent or 
sympathetic place to utilitarianism. If it is mentioned at all, it is as a synonym for 
“merely” economic liberalism and thus as a foil for some alternative conception.
3 The 
French fate of Elie Halévy’s work on philosophical radicalism provides a second 
example. In 1995, The Presses Universitaires de France decided to publish a new edition 
of Halevy’s classic, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism. At least part of the reason 
appears to have been to encourage consideration of Anglo-American political thought, 
particularly that of John Rawls. By the 1990s the work of Rawls was well known in 
France, but its appreciation and appropriation was impeded by the inability of French 
audiences to understand Rawls’s protracted engagement with utilitarianism. Why would 
he have picked such an interlocutor? Belatedly discovered was the surprising fact that a 
well-known French scholar and public intellectual, author of l’Ère des tyrannies, had 
written a long and serious book on liberalism and the doctrine of utility. Moreover, this 
text was a classic in England and America but was largely unknown to French readers, 
available only in a crumbling American paperback edition. Unfortunately, Halevy’s 
discussion of utilitarianism shed little light on contemporary Anglo-American 
philosophy—hence the rather awkward editorial decision to forego a scholarly critical  
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edition for one that appended to each volume a “postface” by a contemporary philosopher 
or economist.  
It may seem that the very distinguished group of French Bentham scholars 
associated with the Centre Bentham and with a new translation of Bentham’s works put 
the lie to my assertion that anti-Benthamism is still the default pattern in French 
intellectual life. But I think they make my case, for these scholars take ignorance and 
dismissal of utilitarianism as the starting point for their project. In June 2009 when the 
Centre Bentham and the University of Rennes held a conference on “Two Centuries of 
Utilitarianism,” the prospectus noted at the outset that “utilitarianism remains largely 
misunderstood in France, where it has been reduced to a couple of caricatured positions 
which disparage its image.”  
Nineteenth-century marginalizations 
In accounting for the ever-increasing marginalization of the doctrine of utility in 
nineteenth-century France, I will simplify matters by putting to the side its most trenchant 
critics: Catholic conservatives and various circles of positivists and socialists.  We might 
expect these groups to be hostile.
4 Instead, I focus on those who wished to build a 
representative political regime in the wake of the Revolution. Whereas in England 
political liberals were either receptive to utilitarian ideas or gave them a serious hearing, 
in France, these ideas were met with indifference or outright antipathy in liberal circles.
5 
In order to sketch out the contours of this rejection, I offer the following relatively 
uncontroversial general descriptors of utilitarianism as a system of thought. First, it is 
consequentialist.  Utilitarians posit that the rightness or wrongness of an action is due to 
the goodness or badness of its consequences. Second, it is rooted in the senses and in  
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want satisfaction. Utilitarians characterize well-being in a way that has something to do 
with the priority of perceived needs and desires. Finally, it is concerned with aggregating 
goods and using that aggregation as a criterion of public policy. Thus utilitarians find a 
congenial home in economics.  Ultimately, these three characteristics—consequentialism, 
sensationalism, and an affinity for economic theory—proved to be unsurpassable 
roadblocks to a serious consideration of utilitarianism in post-Revolutionary France. 
Let me turn first to consequentialism, beginning with the key role of Etienne 
Dumont. More than any other text, Dumont’s three volume work, compiled from 
Bentham’s manuscripts and published in 1802, created the systematic doctrine known as 
“Benthamism.”
6 There are several scholars currently engaged in a close reading of 
Dumont’s Bentham as against the “esoteric Bentham” of the original manuscripts, and 
detailed studies of his distortions (sometimes deliberate, sometimes inadvertent) of 
Bentham’s texts have begun to emerge.
7  What is clear is that Dumont produced only a 
partial version of the early Bentham, a portrait shaped by the concerns of the moderate 
liberal milieu in France during the Directory and Empire, a group among whom Dumont 
had many friends and connections. In the set of writers known as the Idéologues we find 
the same focus on the consequences rather than the inherent rightness of reforms, the 
same rejection of natural rights rhetoric as unstable and incendiary in favor of the more 
certain language of utility, the same grandiose hopes for utility as an overarching science 
that would end the chaos in morals, and the same emphasis on a particular psychology of 
the association of ideas.
8 These close associations between Dumont’s Bentham and the 
Idéologues served to link Bentham’s fortunes to theirs.
9  
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In the consequentialist language of utility, Dumont and the Idéologues hoped to 
find a neutral conciliatory principle that could bring together all parties of good will and 
consolidate and advance the civil gains of the Revolution. Ironically, however, this move 
from natural rights to utility antagonized rather than enticed possible allies and triggered 
an unease greater than any remorse over having naively trumpeted the rights of man. It 
reminded the French public both of the frenzy of utilitarian rhetoric that had precipitated 
the drastic reforms of the early years of the Revolution and of the many subsequent 
episodes in which arbitrary measures were rationalized as necessary to the good of all.  
In A Rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution, William Sewell reminds us of the 
pervasiveness of appeals to general utility in the 1780s, a period in which reformers often 
conflated natural rights and utility, and in which “privileged bodies, even the nobility, 
defined and defended their interests in utilitarian terms instead of by citing their 
venerable privileges.”
10 We might also remember that Helvetius’s book De l’Esprit, with 
its vague criterion of social utility, had an extraordinary resonance in the thirty years 
before the Revolution,  and had in fact helped to disassociate the state from the person of 
the king.
 11  Sewell argues that the pervasiveness of the language of utility in Old Regime 
public discourse and in the early revolutionary period allowed participants in the 
Revolution to avoid facing real issues surrounding privilege. If the concepts of the 
philosophes became “banal” when used in the defense of any and every Old Regime 
interest and institution, nevertheless the widespread use of this utilitarian language also 
affected its speakers, who began to think in terms that would eventually corrode their 
own privileges, terms that “made the public feel that such institutions hardly existed any 
more, so that abolishing them would require only the suppression of a handful of flagrant  
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abuses rather than the traumatic dismantling of an entire social order.” 
12 Many 
conservative liberals who had supported the early reforms of the Revolution began to 
view consequentialist arguments as naïve self-deception, a kind of amnesia about the 
realities of social order, symbolized in the frenzied renunciations of August 4. Under the 
romantic rhetoric of the public good, they now feared, lurked a revolutionary threat that 
would spring out to blindside participants.  
At the same time, appeals to social utility had also become suspect among 
chastened republicans who remembered only too well how calls to rally around the social 
good seemed to have changed in a flash from a code for criticizing royal government to a 
code for supporting the Committee of Public Safety. Finally, Napoleon’s cynical uses of 
consequentialism turned the language of utility into the language of collaboration. In a 
speech to the Council of State, for example, he justified deporting his Jacobin critics for 
an assassination attempt generally known to have been committed by royalists because 
any criticism of the first consul was not in the public interest. “It is permissible to 
examine the question whether, apart from any direct complicity with the authors of the 
attempt of the 2 Nivôse, the public interest does not require these people to be 
deported.”
13 Social utility, c’est moi. 
In light of the use of utilitarian rhetoric both to justify revolutionary terror and to 
excuse absolutist repression, what seemed most urgent to moderates, and what would 
capture many in the post-revolutionary generation, was a rehabilitation of spiritualism 
and rights talk. I take my initial bearing from Madame de Staël and Benjamin Constant, 
who moved progressively away from their erstwhile allies the Idéologues and signaled 
this distancing by an attack on Dumont’s translation of Bentham.
14 I want to emphasize  
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two themes common to their repudiation of the so-called defective philosophy of utility: 
its alleged inability to account for the Revolution’s depravity and its inherent instability. 
Madame de Staël argues that to describe moral and political reasoning in the 
language of reflection on interest, of calculability, means that we can speak only of 
mistakes, not of crimes.
15 In her view, however, the disastrous decisions taken by 
revolutionary agents were much more than errors in calculation. They called for a 
different quality of scorn or disapprobation. We recognize mistakes by their bad 
consequences, she argued, but we mark crimes by a more intimate sense of violation of 
the self and its duties. Meditating on the nature of one’s own moral revulsion reveals that 
there is a different source for moral judgment than calculation of consequences: a self 
that participates in some transcendent order of value. I will return below to this 
preoccupation with the perceived need for an autonomous and stable self.  
A second theme common to Staël and Constant is the expression of deep distrust 
and uneasiness over the instability and malleability of the notion of the happiness of the 
greatest number as a justification for public actions. After Staël’s chapter in De 
l’Allemagne criticizing “morality founded on personal interest” we find a chapter 
criticizing morality “founded on the national interest.” The clear referent is Napoleon’s 
rhetoric of governing in the interest of all by manipulating individual interest and 
ambition, and by repressing personal liberty and judgment for the sake of social peace. 
What was needed, according to Madame de Staël, was not a way to excuse cowardly 
knuckling-under to a despot but rather a way to induce heroic refusals. In a similar vein, 
Constant worried that utilitarianism as explicated by Bentham would cut the ground from  
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under the judicial subject who wished to oppose laws of the sovereign that had crossed a 
moral line. 
Because he was so attuned to the likely effects of rhetorical strategies, Constant 
had a particularly subtle explanation of the drawbacks of the language of utility in the 
post-Revolutionary context, a situation in which the establishment of stable 
representative democracy required citizens and leaders to internalize the idea that popular 
sovereignty had moral limits.
16 He is also a good guide because in many ways his 
differences with Bentham and the Idéologues were not profound, and he continued to see 
them as political allies. Constant admired Bentham, for example, precisely because he 
thought Bentham had not justified a “holocaust of individual citizens” by personifying 
citizens en masse.
17 In his critique of political fallacies, Bentham refused to sacrifice the 
happiness of concrete individuals to abstract holistic fictions. Nevertheless, in a practical 
choice between rights and utility, Constant believed that the responsible theorist must 
abandon Bentham and take a stand with the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Constant 
proceeded to turn the utilitarian critique of natural rights on its head. While he thought it 
was true that proclaiming the natural rights of the citizen opened the way to uncertainty 
and differences of opinion, appealing to utility was yet less sure and more contentious 
and arbitrary. On the one hand, it would lead to an increase in insecurity among common 
citizens. To tell someone he had a right would induce a greater sense of security than to 
say that it was useful that such a person not be punished.
18 Moreover, utility could not 
provide a stable foundation for law. To appeal to utility was to encourage in lawmakers 
the habit of weighing advantages and losses. But the calculation of such consequences  
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was psychologically associated with arbitrary and reckless judgments, with chaotic 
change in law rather than legal continuity.  
As a rhetorical choice for liberals, then, appealing to the consequentialist criterion 
of utility appeared very dicey. To insist that private or public actions were justified by 
their consequences brought to mind self-deception, social and political instability, the 
justification of terror, craven collaboration, and cynical raison d’état. This was company 
to be avoided. 
Let me turn to my second descriptor of utilitarianism: its relationship to 
sensations, to pleasures and pains.  In the context of the early nineteenth century, both the 
followers of Bentham and of the French Idéologues yoked their use of utility as a 
criterion in moral and public life to a theory of associationist psychology known as 
sensationalism, that is, to the legacy of Locke by way of Hartley and Condillac.  Briefly 
the official philosophy of France during the Directory, and the basis of a curriculum in 
primary and secondary schools, sensationalism in some version was pervasive throughout 
the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods. 
 One way to think about the attractiveness of this psychology during the 
revolutionary period is to remember that the corporate structure of the Old Regime was a 
necessary underpinning of persons as well as of social hierarchy. The sudden dismantling 
of an order in which moral norms were imposed by corporate bodies produced anxieties 
about mental functioning as well as social order. During the Revolution the Idéologues 
proposed as a substitute for this traditional order their notion of a social science based on 
association of ideas, of science as a well-made language. Though they themselves 
rejected Jacobinism, nevertheless many observers saw festivals and other deliberate  
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interventions in the social environment as a kind of applied sensationalism, as an attempt 
to create new bonds between citizens by inducing more rational trains of ideas that would 
function as replacements for superstition and the dead weight of custom.
19    
Yet most schemes of revolutionary education and experimentation were either 
stillborn or obvious failures. These failures released—to use an anachronistic Freudian 
term—much free-floating anxiety in liberal circles about how both elites and the masses 
would acquire enough rational ballast to create and sustain democratic institutions. Hence 
the new attractiveness of both Protestantism and Jansenism in these circles, faiths that 
appeared to bolster liberal judgment and produce constancy of character without relying 
on outside authority. But Protestantism was not a viable religion for most of the French, 
and Jansenism was less a living faith than an inspiring myth.
20 Most of the new 
generation turned not to religion, but to philosophy.  Perhaps the most important figure to 
indicate a philosophical way out of their predicament—that is, the failure of 
sensationalist psychology to ground a new moral consensus—was the wayward 
Idéologue, Maine de Biran, who indirectly provided the philosophical substructure of 
nineteenth-century French liberalism.
21  
Biran began as a rather orthodox sensationalist and disciple of Destutt de Tracy. 
During the Napoleonic period and the Restoration, however, he began to deviate from 
Idéologue orthodoxy by exploring the autonomous aspects of consciousness. He had long 
kept a journal, an astute self-examination in which he bemoaned the fact that he and his 
co-revolutionaries seemed to be the playthings of their surroundings—“Tout influe sur 
nous, et nous changeons sans cesse avec ce qui nous environne.”
22 In contrast, he looked 
for a fixed and independent center that would be accessible through introspection and  
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would be able to master its own impressions and ideas. Biran himself made the link 
between the flimsy fragmented faculties allegedly attributed to the self in sensationalist 
psychology and a failure to provide the robust moral notions necessary for a healthy 
political community. Moreover he invokes older French Catholic sources that had long 
criticized Locke and Lockeanism as inconsistent with a Catholic Christian notion of a 
responsible self.
23 While the spiritualism of Mme de Staël and Constant had affinities 
with purified and individualistic forms of Protestantism—and thus remained suspect in 
the French context—Maine de Biran offered a better bridge to Catholic sensibilities, even 
ones that were no longer overtly religious.  
At his death, Maine de Biran’s unpublished manuscripts apparently weighed sixty 
pounds and these weighty papers had been widely circulated. Most important, he was 
picked up by Victor Cousin, who built an enormously successful educational and 
institutional project on a critique of Locke and what he called the “sensualist” school. 
Cousin’s attack on the existing sensationalist basis of utilitarianism, linking it to moral 
confusion and anarchy and arguing that it could never lead to a stable social order, 
centered on its alleged faulty conception of the self—weak, wavering, and susceptible to 
reckless idealism or sordid materialism.  Cousin’s alternative method of “interior 
observation” was not without sharp critics. Stendhal noted that looking within was no 
guarantee of finding anything, and he sarcastically concluded that Cousin’s pedagogical 
philosophy rested on the vacuous command to “fermer les yeux et de chercher dans leurs 
consciences.”
24 Cousin was nevertheless a mesmerizing speaker and something of an 
entrepreneurial and organizational genius. As a member of the Council of Public 
Instruction, he was able to embed his alternate psychology and philosophy in the  
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educational structure of nineteenth-century France. His so-called eclecticism thus became 
the foremost shaper of several generations of state-educated elites, who cut their teeth on 
a refutation of sensationalism and utilitarianism. 
I now turn to my final point about the fate of the philosophy of utility among post-
revolutionary moderates: its relationship to economics. This is not the place to rehearse 
the distinctive path of economics as a discipline in France, but we might begin by 
remembering the reception of certain giants of early twentieth century economic thought 
–for example, Walras—in their native France. All met with wide-spread resistance in a 
profession ensconced in faculties of law, and all initially found their models rejected as 
abstractions that threatened to diminish human dignity. Charles Rist wrote to Walras in 
1906 that economics in France was “specific, descriptive, and literary, marked by a deep 
and general indifference toward any kind of theory or theoretical research.”
25 Many have 
noted the long refusal of French liberalism to accept the economy as a social reality 
capable of being illuminated by a disciplined body of thought.
26 
Political economy emerged only very slowly as a distinct field of study in 
nineteenth-century France. The most eager proponents of both political economy and 
classical laissez-faire in the early part of the century were followers of Tracy, Say, and 
Bentham, known as the “industrial school.” Always a minority voice, many of them—
following J.B.Say himself—also resisted the narrowing of the discipline and expressed a 
desire for a more capacious social analysis that would draw out the connections with law, 
morals, and history. Several key figures drifted into the orbit of the Saint Simonians. The 
single most influential conduit for the ideas of classic political economy in the 1820s was 
the liberal journal of opinion The Globe, which published long articles on Say, Malthus  
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and Ricardo.
27 But the Globe was edited by followers of Cousin, whose stated aim was to 
purge economics of “the utilitarianism of Bentham or the idéologie of Condillac.”
28 They 
defended a rather extreme form of laissez-faire/laissez passez that was also particularly 
hostile to social welfare measures on the grounds of the need to recognize the moral duty 
of each member of society to be responsible for his own autonomous self. Those thinkers 
who did self-consciously take on the task of theorizing the social question—the St. 
Simonians, the Catholic school of “social economists” or mavericks like Sismondi—were 
also overtly and vocally anti-utilitarian and explicitly critical of the Idéologues and 
Bentham. They identified the philosophy of utility with a defective science of political 
economy that made a mockery of the phrase “the greatest good of the greatest number.”
29 
Already suspect because of its consequentialism, materialism, and association 
with economics, utilitarianism in its Bentham/Dumont form had a final fatal flaw: it was 
perceived as indigestibly English. A favored polarity in the Protestant Swiss Dumont’s 
presentation of Bentham was that of Bentham’s English depth and seriousness versus the 
superficiality and outward show of French theorists.
30 Whether enmeshed in the 
anglophilia of the (very) few or the Anglophobia of the majority, discussions of 
utilitarianism often dwelled on its English pedigree, rather than its universal applicability, 
and this association with perfidious Albion could be interpreted as an affront to national 
honor. Until recently Bentham’s own claims to originality and the focus of Bentham 
scholars on his rationalistic and systematizing biases have often combined to make him 
seem sui generis in England—the most continental and atypical of English theorists. 
Only recently have his projects of law reform been rooted in English soil.
31 Ironically, 
however, French receptions often associated Bentham with an English alternative that  
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either was alleged to reflect a distinctive national character or to have evolved out of 
special conditions. For those very reasons, he was often dismissed as an unreliable guide.  
So far I have pointed to coalescing points of attack on utilitarianism among 
liberals in France: its consequentialist rhetoric and sensationalist foundations were 
criticized as dangerous, destabilizing, and immoral, and its connections to economic 
liberalism were dismissed as limiting or unnecessary, if not—as some went so far as to 
say—sordid  and anti-French.  I now want to make one large claim. Considering that 
utilitarianism was under simultaneous attack by conservatives as Godless and by 
socialists and positivists as unscientific, these multiple repudiations from the center 
established a pattern of indifference and hostility that was largely set by mid-century.  
Henceforth, utilitarianism appears largely as an oppositional construct: a simplistic foil 
for successive waves of academic consolidators in economics, sociology, and law. In the 
twentieth century, when Foucault takes Bentham’s Panopticon as a potent symbol of the 
coercive disciplinary side of allegedly enlightened reform schemes, the cultural soil had 
already been well-prepared to receive Bentham as a bad seed. Bentham the sinister 
precursor of totalitarianism joined Bentham the proponent of soulless economic 
calculation. To be a utilitarian was to go over to the dark side of modernity.  
Pattern Breaks 
I turn now to a brief discussion of two dissident French voices who resist this 
disdain for utilitarianism. Although they write sixty years apart, in very different 
circumstances, and from quite different intellectual formations –and although neither was 
a utilitarian—both Alexis de Tocqueville and Elie Halévy had empathetic encounters 
with aspects of utilitarianism that were extraordinarily fruitful. I can do no more than  
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sketch in broad strokes some commonalities in these moments of appreciation, which join 
a long philosophical tradition of French observers of English liberty, but I want to note in 
particular the shared impulse to take what had become a negative caricature and turn it 
into a liberating trope.  
Their first common move is to make a virtue of the vice of Anglo-Americanism or 
Englishness: to draw the foreign into the territory of subtle comparison rather than 
scornful contrast. In Tocqueville’s Democracy in America and Old Regime, in Halévy’s 
The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism and English histories, the American and English 
experiences become deliberate laboratories for studying modern political culture and for 
identifying the possible interactions among ideas, institutions, and political action. 
Tocqueville famously said that he saw in America “more than America” and Halevy’s 
encounter with England was a vehicle for a lifelong meditation on the values of 
individualism, liberty, and the legacy of the Enlightenment in Europe.
32 This close 
examination of another society to illuminate more general lessons involves a deliberate 
rejection of the salience of national character to theoretical analysis. In a letter to a friend, 
Halévy noted acerbically “Bentham is no doubt a purely English phenomenon, just as 
Marx is a purely German, or even a purely Jewish phenomenon. But what is the use of 
reasoning like this?”
33 In fact, Tocqueville and Halévy perceived in America and England 
a fertile mix of familiarity and distance: close enough to be brought in the same 
comparative frame, far enough away to induce analytical clarity. Indeed they use the 
same language to describe their first encounters with American or English patterns of 
behavior and institutions; these patterns “astonish;” they jolt the observer into a kind of 
wondering curiosity which is the basis of all critical reflection.
34  
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What do these writers see when they peer into this Anglo-American parallel universe? 
Not a world of abstract utilitarian maximizers, but rather groups of people who speak the 
language of utility in a dialect quite unfamiliar to the French. In this world, familiar ideas 
have unanticipated consequences, and entities thought to be mutually exclusive live 
together in practice : consequentialist rhetoric coexists with political stability and 
continuity; those who proclaim themselves to be motivated by pleasure and pain practice 
asceticism; dogma does not always drive out tolerance; the clash of doctrines leads to 
political compromise; and zeal does not lead to the barricades. Let me describe briefly 
how different pictures of this world come into focus first in Tocqueville, then in Halévy. 
During his second trip to England, while he was writing Democracy in America, 
Tocqueville was struck by the strange sight of a philosophical radicalism that—so he 
thought—posed no revolutionary threat. As in America, he was surprised by the ways in 
which Radical behavior confounded his expectations. Like their French counterparts, they 
appeared to be dogmatists on issues like popular sovereignty, universal suffrage, and the 
superior moral claims of the many over the few. Yet they combined zeal with acceptance 
of compromise, co-existing in a contentious reformist political space with the New 
Whigs.
35 Tremendously excited by the “confusion of contrary tendencies in English 
development”
36 Tocqueville tries to theorize and synthesize these tendencies in his 
famous chapters on the Anglo-Americans’ embrace of self-interest properly understood 
in the second volume of Democracy in America.
 37 “The doctrine of self-interest properly 
understood is not new,” Tocqueville writes, “but it has been universally accepted by 
today’s Americans. It has become popular. It lies at the root of all action. It crops up in 
everything Americans say.”
38 Tocqueville’s fundamental innovation in these key  
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chapters, and throughout the text of Democracy in America, was to view the practical 
fusion of private interest and public utility that he claimed to have found in the United 
States as a dense sociological and psychological artifact, and to explore the conditions 
under which, and the mechanisms by which individuals come to desire what is in their 
long-term interest. He praised this new kind of applied utilitarianism that bridged 
economic, political, and religious spheres, especially through the mechanism of 
association. 
Tocqueville here contests Benjamin Constant on his own grounds and does him 
one better. Consequentialist rhetoric has no intrinsic psychological associations; it is 
entirely capable of being combined with notions of sacrifice, stable deferred gratification, 
religious attitudes, and even a kind of honor depending on how it is embedded in 
institutions and moeurs. Indeed, his point is that the American example shows us that 
democratic utilitarianism is completely compatible in practice with a form of freedom. 
But we cannot grasp these complex enabling patterns of behavior by considering ideas in 
abstraction. What we need is a description of how ideas function in certain self-
reinforcing social, economic, political and religious spheres and how those ideas in turn 
shape social life. Not a history of ideas, but a thick elucidation of ideas in history. 
Like Tocqueville, Elie Halévy begins his studies of England with a sense of its 
ability to arouse what he calls a “valuable capacity for wonder.”
39 The Philosophical 
Radicals in particular challenge many of his own assumptions about the utilitarian “type”. 
Halevy notes—as did Tocqueville—that consequentialist rhetoric could express a high 
moralism and that utilitarian pleasure looked a lot like bourgeois discipline, pain 
avoidance, or abstinence. How did Halevy capture and describe this set of opposites?    
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Henri Bergson wrote to Halévy in 1904 that he admired Halévy’s method of 
discovering different tendencies from those that one would normally expect by drawing 
out the latent postulates of systems of ideas.
40 I want to examine this practice by looking 
at the most famous example of it: Halevy’s analytic distinction between the artificial 
identification of interests and the natural or spontaneous identification of interests, a 
latent contradiction that he places at the heart of his narrative of utilitarian theory and 
practice over half a century. 
Many commentators—especially among contemporary French neo-liberals—see 
Halevy as particularly prescient for noticing the despotic tendencies inherent in the 
artificial identification of interests, for drawing out the analogy between utilitarianism 
and its Rousseauistic cousin, a democratic theory that tended to distrust all intermediary 
powers and social divisions and led to an absolutist democracy.
41 But I would argue that 
Halévy’s use of the analytic distinction between artificially and naturally identified 
interests has a different center of gravity. In fact Halévy uses it in a more even-handed 
way to map out how these contradictory principles were combined in various practices 
and continually adapted to different realities. A close reading also reveals that the lure of 
the idea that interests would be spontaneously identified, as in markets, was for him as 
dangerous an illusion as that they must be artificially combined by the legislator. He 
admired the historical trajectory of philosophical radicalism in part because he found 
within it the lesson that these two thought experiments—one leading to an 
omnicompetent rational state and the other leading to a society of sovereign individuals, 
what he called rationalism and individualism—could be held by the same people and 
peacefully combined in changing concrete situations. Rather than blaming utilitarians for  
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not seeing the incoherence in their own practice or the dangerousness of their principles, 
he praises them for living with inconsistency. Some such balance, some such restraint 
from the drive to realize the full implications of ideas in practice was necessary for a 
modern nation to become free, that is to become “a country of voluntary obedience, of an 
organization freely initiated and freely accepted.”
42 
Halévy’s recognition of a link between the doctrine of utility and behavior 
patterns of self-restraint and self-discipline leads him ever more deeply into what might 
be called the “social world” of the English people;  he is interested particularly in aspects 
of the social ethos that blunt the emergence of violent power struggles, but do not 
completely inhibit reform. His magisterial six-volume work on the History of the English 
People displays a command over a remarkable range of subjects—administrative 
institutions, the legal profession, local government, the press, parties, land tenure, forms 
of religious and artistic experience—and illustrates his move from sociologically-
informed intellectual history to what he calls straight history.  But his is a straight history 
that takes ideas seriously. It is here that he develops his still- influential thesis about the 
prophylactic effect of Methodism, i.e., the tendency of evangelical religion to counteract 
revolutionary tendencies in England. As Tocqueville did for America, Halevy explores 
the tangled mix of religious and utilitarian ideas in both motivating and restraining 
individual initiative. “The fundamental paradox of English society,” he concludes “. . . is 
precisely the partial junction and combination of these two forces theoretically so 
hostile.” It is a mixture, he says, “whose constituents are often mingled beyond the 
possibility of analysis, a compound of Evangelicalism and Utilititarianism.”
43   
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Conclusion 
Both Tocqueville and Halévy, then, narrate counter-histories to that of the French: 
histories in which utilitarian ideas did not whither, but were embedded in a complex set 
of practices that in some way tempered the disruptive effects of rationalism and 
individualism without entirely stopping them. I want to conclude with two thoughts on 
what can be learned from these reflective detours. 
First, Tocqueville and Halévy themselves were clear on the lesson they wished to 
draw. These alternate paths did not represent a more desirable road-not-taken that the 
French should try to pursue. The utilitarian route was neither available nor desirable for 
the French.  Rather, the lesson was that if rationalism and individualism could be tamed 
and harnessed in societies saturated with utilitarianism, these tendencies could also be 
controlled and guided in societies where they were expressed in another vernacular (like 
France). Moreover, these counter narratives offered clues to the ways in which the French 
might plot an escape route. By unsettling French views of reality, by showing the 
contingency of what looked like necessary oppositions, such detailed portraits could 
inform the art of public affairs by alerting both elites and citizens to potentially analogous 
moderating factors. They also showed the need for certain exemplary liberal virtues – 
above all tolerance, compromise, and what Halevy called hopeful stoicism.  He once said 
that studying the evolution of one’s own convictions was like studying the history of a 
society; if we realized the accidental foundations of our settled convictions, we might 
give others a more patient hearing and be less likely to commit violence for an idea.  
Second, these counter histories invite us to think about a kind of “presentist” 
history that is particularly characteristic of the French liberal tradition. Both Tocqueville  
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and Halevy took it as axiomatic that the study of past theories and of the interaction of 
theories with political projects could not and should not be freed from the pressure of 
contemporary questions.  Tocqueville’s scholarly work was directly aimed at his 
contemporaries in the French political class and informed his own long political career, 
and Halevy wrote very early in his academic career that he wanted to be both reflective 
and active, to be a rationalist with “rage.”
44   
It is sometimes assumed that explicitly normative projects and truly historical 
works are like oil and water. History adds mere window dressing to analytic theory, while 
contemporary concerns lead to a flatfooted history that looks for ancestors, projects false 
connections between ideas into the past, and is tone deaf to the speech of the dead. This is 
sometimes the case. But not always.  Philosophically motivated histories like those of 
Tocqueville and Halévy unsettle this conviction. Like their own counter-histories of a 
society in which apparently contradictory principles are conjoined and combined, their 
works suggest that passionate commitment to an interpretive hypothesis with obvious 
contemporary relevance can co-exist in creative equilibrium with erudition, skill, 
judgment, command of sources and a self-conscious desire not to distort. And the result 
can be work so illuminating and perceptive that it not only allows us to contest the 
interpretive historical hypothesis out of the richness of the work itself, but enlarges the 
political imagination.  
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